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1 Introduction
Africa Power and Politics Programme (APPP)
research into business and politics in Africa shows
that under certain conditions, neo-patrimonial
governance can support strong economic
performance (see Kelsall, this IDS Bulletin). This
article provides support for that argument from
the Malawi case study. It argues that although
Malawian economic governance has never been
without problems, for significant periods the
country has performed as well or better than
might have been expected, given its geographical
location and natural resource endowments.
It finds that underlying these promising episodes is a
pattern of centralised, long-horizon rent
management. Rent management is centralised
when there is a structure in place that allows a
person or group at the apex of the state to
determine the major rents that are created and to
distribute them at will. It is long horizon when
leaders have a vision that inspires them to create
rents and discipline rent-seeking with a view to
expanding income over the long term. Further, it
finds that a crucial enabling factor for centralised,
long-horizon rent management is appropriate norms
governing relations between the political leadership
and the economic technocracy. Two dimensions seem
to be important. One is the degree to which the
economic technocracy is subject in practice to
vertical coordination, such that it receives and is
responsive to policy directives emanating from the
political leadership. The second dimension is what
we propose to call technocratic integrity. Where
there is technocratic integrity, technocrats are
typically willing and able to provide robust,
technically informed advice to leading politicians. If
unwise or incoherent policies are adopted and
implemented, it is only after the relevant technical
objections have been considered and rejected by
those in power. Where technocratic integrity is
absent, for example because senior officials are
systematically either afraid or badly equipped to
provide the requisite advice, policy is likely to be bad
more often and for a more complex set of reasons.
The article proceeds by outlining the main
dimensions of rent management under different
regimes in post-colonial Malawi. It argues that
the period 1965–79 was one of centralised, long-
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horizon rent management in which the economy
grew healthily at a rate above the sub-Saharan
average – a significant achievement given
Malawi’s small size, poor natural resource base,
and land-locked geography; 1980–94, by contrast,
was a period in which rent management drifted.
Although it remained quite centralised, it
became geared more to the short term, and to
the vagaries of an externally imposed structural
adjustment programme: economic performance
was poor. The situation deteriorated still further
under the 1994–2004 regime of President Bakili
Muluzi. This was a classic period of decentralised,
short-horizon rent management, and the
economy entered a tailspin. A recovery was made
during the first term of President Bingu wa
Mutharika (2004–09), who reintroduced some
aspects of long-horizon rent centralisation.
2 Banda I (1965–79)
The post-independence period in Malawi
witnessed a relentless centralisation of power
under the autocratic personality of the country’s
first President, H. Kamuzu Banda. A skilful set
of manoeuvres transformed his status from
Prime Minister to President-for-Life, placed him
at the apex of an extensive party machinery,
crushed and outlawed the political opposition,
and put him in control of state systems from
parastatals to the censorship board.
Power concentration, when combined with his
own hard work and intelligence, allowed Banda to
be directly involved or to oversee policymaking in
every sector. His strategy has been called ‘state
monopoly capitalism’, with a fusion of the state
and business in his own person (Harrigan 2001:
37). Broadly speaking, economic rents were used
to create a modern economic infrastructure, to
stimulate commercial farming, and create an
African business class. The government
constructed roads, a railway, a university, and the
new capital city, Lilongwe. Over 1m hectares of
agricultural land in the customary sector were
converted to leasehold ‘estates’ and provided to
aspiring commercial farmers achikumbe (sing:
mchikumbe), who were licensed to grow tobacco,
and who received extension services, credit and
marketing support (Frankenberger et al. 2003;
Kalonga Stambuli 2002; Ellis et al. 2003; Thomas
1975). Asians were barred from rural enterprises
(Thomas 1975) and reorganised lending
institutions provided credit to emerging African
businessmen (Pryor 1990).
State bureaucrats, MPs and party functionaries
topped the list of beneficiaries, although people
not known to be ardent loyalists also acquired
land and support for growing export crops.
Banda offered to co-sign loans for some senior
civil servants who did not have sufficient funds to
acquire estates. Beneficiaries straddling the
rural–urban divide moved profits from farming
into urban real estate, retail trading and
transportation. The most successful farmer-
bureaucrat-businessmen went on to invest in
small-scale secondary industries, like food
processing. All were beholden to Banda and his
Malawi Congress Party (Mhone 1992; Pryor
1990; Frankenberger et al. 2003; Ellis et al. 2003).
Banda himself was also a key beneficiary of state
power. In 1961 he had formed Press Holdings, a
company to run the party newspaper. After
independence it expanded greatly, acquiring old
expatriate estates (via government), tobacco
interests, and many other operations including
food processing, wholesaling and retailing,
financial services, textiles and manufacturing, and
distilling and bottling. Before its restructuring in
the early 1980s, Press Holdings had interests in 17
subsidiary companies and 23 associated
companies (Press Corporation Ltd 2008). For
much of the period it contributed to national
growth, paid hefty state taxes, and Banda sought
to serve as a role model for other entrepreneurs.
It was involved in every sector of the economy,
especially estate agriculture, and held a majority
shareholding in the two commercial banks that
loaned to estate leaseholders. Senior staff moved
between it and the public service, and strict
oversight by Banda and others, which included
dismissals and imprisonment of staff for theft,
promoted a professional ethic.
The early years of Banda’s government were
marked by rapid economic growth (5.9 per cent
per annum between 1964 and 1979). Banda was
‘very successful in obtaining investable resources
both from external and internal sources,
particularly for the public sector’ (Pryor 1990:
47–8). Besides donor aid and some foreign
investment (e.g. Lonhro, Carlsberg), investment
finance was drawn from the public sector:
parastatals’ profits averaged about 1 per cent of
GDP (Pryor 1990: 50–1). Commercial estates,
especially tobacco estates, forged ahead of
subsistence agriculture, providing a return on
investment that ranged between 22 per cent and
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67 per cent in the 1970s (Pryor 1990). Meanwhile,
the manufacturing sector increased its share of
GDP from 7 per cent at independence to 13 per
cent in 1980. Employment therein increased by a
high, average rate of 6.8 per cent per year
(Chipeta and Mkandawire 2008: 158). Moreover,
the growth in real GDP per worker in the period
1960–79 was about 3 per cent per annum.
We see, then, that Banda used the power of the
state to create economic rents that were
productive, and to cement his own political
domination. By contrast, less productive forms of
rent-seeking – corruption, predation and theft –
were not much tolerated. Banda stated that his
‘main business’ was the maintenance of a ‘stable
government, an efficient, honest and incorruptible
administration. People must come here when they
have money to invest, get a licence without
putting so many pounds in the pocket of a certain
Minister first’ (Baker 2001: 162). Furthermore,
those who worked directly with Banda assert that
he was ‘not personally corrupt’.1 Bureaucrats
working for the state, Malawi Congress Party
(MCP) or Press who were accused of theft were
dealt with swiftly. The result was a civil service
that was relatively honest, hardworking and
professional (Anders 2002, 2006).
Here, the strength of the technocracy emerges as
an important part of the Malawian story. An
enthusiastic Anglophile, Banda, inherited and
adapted the British colonial model of public
service to his own ends. Europeans remained in
many principal secretary and other senior
positions for several years after independence.
They set the tone and standards for two decades:
it was ‘a dedicated civil service that was clean,
efficient and corruption-free’. Many of the ‘early
crop of local talent’ were trained by British
instructors at the Staff Training College
(Institute of Public Administration) at Mpemba,
Blantyre. Besides the law and other technical
subjects, they were taught to ‘say “no”, without
saying “no”… “it can be done sir, but you may
want to consider …”’. Some of those who worked
in the Reserve Bank were trained in the Bank of
England first, while administrative officers were
often young men who had been to universities
outside Malawi, on scholarships. Those that did
well were recognised and promoted through the
ranks. In the early years, staff felt a career in the
civil service was predictable and professionally
rewarding.
Banda’s ministers were a different breed. MPs
were men and women who were selected by
senior party officials in the districts and
recommended to Banda as candidates. Most were
poorly educated, without much overseas
experience or technical capacity. Banda
patronised and frequently referred to them as
‘my boys’ (Williams 1978: 200–1). They ‘rarely
had an input into policy’. Instead, Banda bounced
ideas off his cadre of principal secretaries, whose
skills and education meant he related to them
more easily. Public servants were told: ‘the civil
service is the civil service. Do not get near to any
minister. No minister should influence you about
what you can do’.
3 Banda II (1980–1994)
By the late 1970s the formidable centralisation
that Banda had exercised over rent management
was beginning to weaken. By this stage, the
President was already in his 80s, and as his
powers waned, those around him became more
influential, including his nurse/mistress (Cecilia
Kadzamira), a few other women and
Kadzamira’s uncle, John Tembo. Prospective
political successors’ attempts to win Banda’s
favour gave rise to considerable political
intrigue. The period was marked by a clear
‘mixing of politics and civil service’, with cliques
vying for influence and public servants
interacting directly with ministers and
politicians, and by a culture of detentions and
human rights abuse that kept many in line, but
at the same time demoralised and frightened the
public service.
In these conditions it was sometimes difficult for
senior officials to engage constructively with the
President over policy. By the late 1970s a
combination of internal imbalances and external
shocks had caused the economy to run into
problems. An International Monetary Fund
(IMF) structural adjustment programme, which
included a reform of Press Holdings, aimed to
address them. However, issues like the need to
dismember Press and restructure ADMARC, the
state agricultural marketing organisation, were
difficult to raise for fear that the President would
get angry and react by firing staff. Thus, civil
servants and politicians sometimes took their
problems to ‘the women’ (members of the
Women’s League) who would take them to
Banda. Reportedly, civil servants also feared
introducing World Bank and IMF officials to 
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the President for fear of what he might say to
them. Added to this, intra-governmental
intrigues contributed to the delay in publication
of the development plan DevPol II until the mid-
1980s, signalling the loss of policy direction
(Pryor 1990). Although reforms resulted in
periodic growth, they were unable to bring
Malawi back to its 1970s performance figures
(Kaluwa et al. 1992).
The lesson here is that Banda’s power and
manner of using it created fear in the civil
service that in the good years underpinned
efficiency and honesty, but undermined its
effectiveness as his personal control waned and
conditions became more difficult.
In addition, economic restructuring under the
tutelage of the IMF and World Bank disrupted in
significant ways the system for channelling rents
that had worked, with limitations, under
Banda I. The policy of reforming the estate
sector to reduce subsidies and make it more
competitive, together with the shift against
import-substitution industrialisation, heralded a
major change in the types of rent creation and
distribution that could be encouraged. The
structural adjustment programme, changes to
Press Holdings and its relationship with the
government reduced the amount of cash
available to Banda to promote his loyalists.
Other problems arose – the rising cost of
transport and fuel and the impact this had on
estates; reduced wages, especially in the civil
service, etc. As the 1980s passed, those who had
benefited during Banda’s first 15 years were
being disappointed economically and began to
champion regime change.
4 Muluzi (1994–2004)
Political liberalisation brought to power Bakili
Muluzi, a senior member of the Malawi Chamber
of Commerce and Industry. For the first few years
of his tenure, economic performance improved,
but towards the end of the 1990s it rapidly
deteriorated as the government faced the
prospect of securing re-election.
The democratic transition set new parameters for
managing political competition. Where Banda
had control of parliament and the selection of
MPs, Muluzi had to contend with opposition
parties, multi-party elections, a minority
government and coalition forming,2 and errant
MPs who could possibly be bought by other
parties’ leaders. To retain support, the President
needed resources to distribute: he appointed
(often unqualified) loyalists to parastatal boards
for instance, increased the size of his cabinet to
include more cronies, and oversaw the siphoning
of funds from government coffers by senior party
people for political and personal ends. Corruption
spiralled out of control (Khembo 2004; Global
Integrity Report 2007).
Misappropriation around procurement was the
main source of illicit funding in the Muluzi years.
It was not as centralised as under Banda, which
is not to say that Muluzi did not have first-hand
knowledge of at least some of his ministers’
deals. Money was illicitly earned and used to
fund political careers, pay off supporters, hire
United Democratic Front (UDF) youth to crush
opponents, and to get rich. The Press Holdings
empire was appropriated from Banda in a cynical
and illegal use of parliament, which left a lasting
imprint on Malawi’s political culture (van Donge
2002). Other scandals affected sugar
distribution, education and, most tragically, the
country’s grain reserves.
The UDF benefited from funds coming from
people who were grateful to the regime for
helping them with business. For instance,
Petroda, a petrol company owned by a Tanzanian,
was awarded a contract to build filling stations
and to import petrol. All government vehicles
were required to buy their petrol from Petroda
stations. In return, one informant claimed,
‘Petroda helped the party so much’.
The centre’s inability to control rents in the way
Banda had done is indicated by what happened
when the party at one point allegedly talked
about starting its own company – such as ruling
parties in other countries have done. According to
our informant, the UDF decided not to do so
because its leaders felt they would not be able to
control the funds coming into the company. It was
reported that previously, some monies that were
supposed to be paid by subordinates in the party
never made it to the top. Muluzi and others
feared, then, that they did not have the systems
in place to manage such an operation. Instead,
they used outsiders to win government contracts
and then took kickbacks. Many such scams
became public, though few were prosecuted while
Muluzi ruled (Anti-Corruption Bureau 2003).
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Policymaking also deteriorated in this period.
Muluzi’s and many ministers’ relatively scant
experience of government (e.g. Thompson n.d.)
gave them little knowledge of how to manage the
civil service. First, many senior staff were
thought by the UDF to be MCP-loyalists and
were dismissed and replaced by people who had
little but allegiance to commend them.
Moreover, wages and conditions had declined in
the 1980s and the public service was restive.
Discipline was further eroded by new laws that
reportedly reduced senior officials’ willingness to
‘manage’ their staff.
A shift in priorities from governing to politicking
was evident at the very top: according to one
informant, before 1999 or so ‘the President and
political leadership were able to listen to advice,
respected the budget, and there were internally
vibrant discussions’. After that, decision-making
around development issues took second place and
policy documents that were produced were not
implemented. Staff at the most senior level were
replaced by people who above all else, wanted a
third term for Muluzi. Another UDF politician
pushed the date of this shift in priorities back to
1998, claiming that the ‘Zomba mafia hi-jacked’
the President. Similarly, ministry-level bodies
debated and set policy in the early years, but this
gave way to politics after a while. Compounding
the problem was Muluzi’s unwillingness to spend
time studying the details laid out in policy
documents, as the previous and later presidents
did; he would read them through and just say
‘fine’. At the sector level the politicisation of
appointments and resource allocations was evident
by the mid-1990s, and conspicuous during the 1999
election campaign (Cammack 1998, 2000). The
resulting political economic ‘free-for-all’ produced
negative growth in what has come to be called the
‘lost decade’. GDP per capita remained around
US$160 after the mid-1990s. National growth
vacillated (it was +5 per cent in 1997 but –4 per
cent in 2001) and the Human Development Index
dropped (Government of Malawi 2006; IMF 1998,
2003; Frankenberger et al. 2003).
5 Mutharika (2004–09)
Having failed to secure a third term, Muluzi
engineered the election of a successor, Bingu wa
Mutharika. But Mutharika soon proved unwilling
to accept the role of figurehead President.
Within months of the 2004 elections, he broke
with Muluzi and the UDF, creating his own party
(DPP). Mutharika had a new, more growth-
oriented development vision than Muluzi;
government finances were stabilised; top levels
of the polity and the old administration were
targeted in an anti-corruption drive; and the
President adopted a distinctly Banda-esque
personal style. A key appointment was ex-IMF
official Goodall Gondwe at the Ministry of
Finance. Gondwe is generally credited with the
much-improved financial performance of
Mutharika’s first term, although Gondwe
himself cites presidential direction as central to
finance-policy formulation.
It took some months for President Mutharika to
establish his own administration. He had done this
by early 2005, but his ‘ungratefulness’ to Muluzi,
his reliance on MPs and aides willing to ‘cross the
floor’ and join the DPP, and his proclaimed ‘zero
tolerance’ on corruption meant that for the next
four years he was tormented politically. In
response, he ignored the Constitution, his UDF
vice president, the courts, the opposition-
dominated parliament, often the public and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), as well as
donors. Democratic consolidation stalled and
power was centralised in the President’s hands.
Early on, civil servants noticed Mutharika was
‘more serious’, promoting discipline and
‘demanding accountability’. ‘That guy
[Mutharika] has set things straight’, one
explained. He is ‘an economist and he doesn’t
fool around. He will hire someone and get rid of
them if they are no good. He tells officials “don’t
use money if it’s not in the budget”’. His style of
working was reminiscent of Dr Banda’s but
without ‘fear’ as a motivating factor. He
reportedly worked hard and took time over
details, studying policy memos, quizzing his
senior staff, and debating policy with them. Self-
confident officials feel able to say ‘no’ to the
President and to present him with views that do
not match his own. A second public officer
confirmed that Mutharika takes a keen interest
in government initiatives and ‘goes and looks
over things himself ’. He gives orders and follows
through to ensure things get done right.
‘Everyone knows he knows’ what is going on and
so staff are incentivised to perform.
His ‘zero tolerance’ of corruption meant political
opponents being charged; a few went to prison.
But he has also removed officials from his own
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government who were accused of corruption
(Nyasa Times, 2 December 2009). Now, his Auditor
General regularly presents comprehensive reports
detailing government losses in parliament, which
has demonstrated a new standard of transparency
and an attempt to root out the ‘allowance culture’
and corruption from the civil service. Nonetheless,
both remain widespread.
One UDF politician outlined a pattern of how
contracts were being awarded by people at the top
of government. What happens, he said, is that
contracts to companies are ‘not opened up’ to
outsiders. Instead, people in and near government
take an ‘active part’ in winning tenders. Also,
tenders were being awarded to people who are
‘outside the procurement system’, i.e. who did not
present or win bids openly. He also claimed that
‘front companies’ have been set up and friends of
the President are being used to win contracts for
fertiliser and other goods. He asserted that the
local boss of the Portuguese Mota-Engil Company,
doing road construction in Malawi, is close to
government (see Nyasa Times, 11 August 2010) and
is therefore winning all of the contracts that used
to go to companies such as Group 5, which he said
was favoured by the UDF. The inner circle of DPP
are ‘skimming money from contracts’ for work
done by Mota-Engil… There is a lot of rot’. He
concluded by saying that Muluzi’s and Mutharika’s
rent-giving differed: the UDF’s ‘way of working’
was with outside contractors. He admitted that
Muluzi’s people received kickbacks from those
winning contracts, but claimed that UDF senior
members did not take part in doing the work
contracted out. Now top officials in government
take ‘an active part in all contracts’. How accurate
these charges are requires additional research. But
if what is rumoured about contracting is true, it
appears that rents in Mutharika’s first term were
more centrally and tightly controlled and more in
line with the national development vision than in
the Muluzi years.
Neo-patrimonial politics in Mutharika’s first
term were quite different than in the Muluzi
years. Especially important for growth were the
renewed emphasis on civil service integrity, better
fiscal policy due to the appointment of an
experienced macroeconomist as Minister of
Finance and Mutharika’s personal commitment
to improving the state’s performance. He was
dismissive of opposition politicians generally and
therefore to all compromises that might have
undermined his economic policies. In this respect,
as well as in matters of style, Malawi witnessed a
return to patterns established by Banda.
Mutharika’s first term may best be described as a
form of hard-budget clientelism in which elite
political support was bought, partly by means of
access to rents in the business sector, although
not in a way that derailed the macro-economy.
Winning political support by handing out cabinet
posts and political appointments was evident as
usual, and votes were harvested from a poverty-
oriented agricultural strategy, and by supporting
chiefs who brought constituents into line.
Economic performance undoubtedly improved in
Mutharika’s first term. GDP growth rates went
up, and there was an improvement in
smallholder agriculture, ‘which was supported by
the continuation of the input subsidy program
and intensification of irrigation agricultural
programs’ (Government of Malawi 2008).
Inflation remained in single-digit figures in spite
of higher international food and energy prices.
Credit for this is given to the agricultural inputs
scheme and the stability of the Kwacha. Interest
rates were the lowest in a decade due to
reductions in inflation. Income from exports
climbed (due, the government said, to pricing
policies of agricultural goods, and to the input
programme). Reforms to improve budgeting,
revenue collection and debt management were
put in place. Particularly beneficial to the overall
growth figure in 2008 was the ‘manufacturing;
financial and insurance services; information and
communication, and construction’ sub-sectors
(Government of Malawi 2008).3 Growth was
reported to be three times the African average in
2008 (Banda 2009).
Since the 2009 election the economy has faltered
and stumbled from one crisis to another – the
exit of cotton and tobacco buyers, shortages of
foreign exchange, artificially high exchange
rates and the emergence of a black market in
currency, fuel shortages, and budget overruns, all
resulting in donor threats to withhold aid. In
March 2010, the Department for International
Development (DFID) cut its aid budget to
Malawi by £3 million in response to the
President’s purchase of his own $13.3 million jet
airplane (Nyasa Times, 10 March 2010). Economic
trends now noticeable nationwide are
undoubtedly related to the removal of Gondwe at
the Ministry of Finance and his replacement with
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the more amenable Ken Kandodo (previously
head of several Banda-family enterprises).
6 Conclusions
Our review of economic and political history in
post-colonial Malawi has revealed a number of
shifts in institutional configurations and economic
performance, which relate directly to the
propositions set out elsewhere in this IDS Bulletin
(see Kelsall). Under the first regime of President
Banda (1964–79), rents and rent-earning
opportunities were directed largely to the
productive sectors, with consequent
improvements in infrastructure, fixed capital
formation and worker productivity. On the whole,
rent creation was centralised and geared to the
long term, and a substantial proportion of those
rents were productive rather than purely
parasitic, with the expected effects on
development performance. Rents also cemented
political stability by providing income-earning
opportunities for a regionally inclusive political
elite. President Banda’s highly repressive, non-
competitive political apparatus was in this and
other respects inclusive in ways that contributed
to stability. His domineering personality was
moderated by a technocratic ethos, enabling a
responsive and efficient civil service to be
maintained. Thus, Banda’s first 15 years fit the
model of developmental patrimonialism very well.
A combination of external shocks, natural
constraints, and flaws internal to Banda’s
development policy model meant that by the end
of the 1970s, a period of restructuring was
required. The evidence suggests that for the
period 1979–94, Banda was losing the personal
capacity to oversee the required changes, and
that information and decision-making systems
within government were breaking down. What is
more, the continuing climate of political
repression made it difficult to challenge the
vision or performance of the leadership, making
reform extremely challenging. Economic policy
drifted as the politics of intrigue and a poorly
conceived donor-driven structural adjustment
programme carried the day.
After 1994, a combination of personal weaknesses
and the forces of political competition
overwhelmed Banda’s successor, Bakili Muluzi.
Partly because of the new climate of political
openness, Muluzi lacked the powers of repression
Banda once possessed, and he focused on political
pay-offs and self-enrichment instead. Rent
creation and distribution were overwhelmingly
directed to short-run, non-productive activities in
a desperate attempt to retain political power; the
developmental logic of previous years
disappeared. Donors attempted to fill the void,
but unsuccessfully (Booth et al. 2005).
During 2004–09, Bingu wa Mutharika did a
reasonable job of balancing political and economic
imperatives. He came to power indebted only to
Muluzi and the UDF for his position. Once he
broke with him, he broadened his room for
manoeuvre. Manipulation and restriction of
formal political institutions provided additional
breathing space in which to build a clientelist base
and popular development programme. Greater
personal authority and a tighter grip over the civil
service than Muluzi undoubtedly helped him
stabilise the economy. The appointment of
Goodall Gondwe to the Ministry of Finance
facilitated better relations with donors and helped
the macro-economy. Unfortunately, Gondwe’s
demotion in 2009 has allowed Mutharika to
pursue more populist economic goals, which has
resulted in poorer performance. Corruption
within government at the point of service delivery
continues to frustrate the population.
One of the other themes which emerges quite
clearly from the Malawi story is the importance
of a strong technocracy to developmental
patrimonialism (see Cammack et al. 2010). On
the basis of our research, we believe that Banda’s
first regime was a clear case of vertically
disciplined technocracy, in which civil servants
were strongly controlled and driven by the
political leadership but nevertheless trained ‘to
say “No” without saying “No”’ and to invite the
leadership to sometimes consider more feasible
alternatives. In Banda I, there seems to have
been adequate technical restraint, even if this left
in place some core weaknesses in the President’s
vision of development. In the second period of
Banda’s regime, however, the civil service began
to deteriorate and political pressure meant that
even very senior officials were too cowed to offer
robust policy advice. The impact was softened,
perhaps, by the fact that the leadership had by
this stage lost some of its vision for development,
with the latter being increasingly determined by
external donors. The result was not white
elephant projects, but rather a directionless and
vacillating reform programme.
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Bingu wa Mutharika’s first term in power may
also be characterised as a vertically disciplined
technocracy. The President appears to have had
a strong development vision, while leaving much
of the detail to technocrats, especially at the
Ministry of Finance.
Bakili Muluzi’s period in office, on the other
hand, at least from the late 1990s onwards, was
characterised by a situation in which the
leadership failed to provide a strong steer,
technocrats were afraid to speak up, and many
officials held their positions on the basis of
factors other than merit (e.g. clientelism). The
result was stasis, or the growth of anti-
developmental opportunistic behaviour.
Overall, it is clear that the technocratic integrity
and vertical discipline which existed during the
Banda I regime and Mutharika’s first term
resulted in an environment which was most
conducive to investment and growth.
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Notes
* This analysis draws upon Cammack et al. 2010
and interviews conducted by Diana Cammack
and Alaudin Osman in January and July 2010.
1 Banda, Tembo, Kadzamira and two others
were charged with two counts of fraud in 1997,
one of which was for using $5.6 million of
government money to build Kamuzu
Academy. The second was for withdrawing
money from the Press Trust before it was
removed from Tembo’s control in the mid-
1990s (ANC Daily News Briefing 1997).
2 The UDF was unable to win the majority of
seats in the National Assembly and so Muluzi
formed coalitions with other parties and
recruited individual opposition politicians.
Why this was so crucial appeared to have little
to do with bills before parliament (as the
parties seemed to share opinions about these
– except about Press, see van Donge 2002) but
more to do with who staffed committees and
controlled funds.
3 ‘Malawi’s President Bingu wa Mutharika was
awarded the Food and Agriculture
Organization’s Agricola Medal in honour of
his substantial contribution towards
‘transforming the country’s economy from a
state of food deficit to a net exporter of maize’
(FAO, 28 November 2008).
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